Keywords
Resource distribution
Social infrastructure
Political parties
Subnational politics
How to Cite
Abstract
The objective is to examine how the configuration of the party system at the subnational level affects the transfer of resources for social infrastructure. Little has been written about the effect of the level of competition of the state-level party system on social development.
The working hypotheses are proposed: the greater the competition in the party system at the entity level and if the governor's party coincides with the federal party, the greater the transfer of resources. for social development.
An original database is built with the variables of interest. Using multiple linear regression, the hypothesis is met.
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